Tag Archives: Islam

Muhammad ‘Abduh and Egyptian Islamic Reform

Note: I was offered the opportunity to present a paper at the Middle Eastern and North African Studies Undergraduate Conference at the University of Arizona, but have had numerous cases of the flu since December and the worst case yet hit the day before the conference. As such, I cancelled my presentation, to my immense regret and disappointment, but have decided to post a much briefer version here. Thank you for reading.

Contemporary western discourse on Islam often impose a liberal-conservative, moderate-extremist dichotomy on the Muslim world, ignoring local, idiosyncratic contexts. For instance, such discourse labels the Muslim Brotherhood as a conservative organization, and the Egyptian theologian Muhammad ‘Abduh as a liberal counterexample. The measuring stick western media use, however, is how willing Muslims are to accommodate western influence. ‘Abduh is often seen as sympathetic to western influence, but his political and religious goals were effectively those of the Muslim Brotherhood–to bring the community of believers back to a more authentic practice of Islam because the community has strayed and allowed unlawful innovation.


Muhammad ‘Abduh

The youngest child of a rural farmer, ‘Abduh was born in 1849 in a village called Mahallat Nasr, on the Egyptian Nile Delta, into a middle-class family. Egypt was under a series of economic reforms first initiated by Muhammad Ali, a military leader who wanted to industrialize Egypt like Europe. His economic reforms benefited peasants, including ‘Abduh’s father, and those benefits allowed ‘Abduh to leave his rural home to become an Islamic scholar, or ‘alim. ‘Abduh showed much potential; he reportedly memorized the Qur’an at the age of ten. At thirteen, he went to study at the Ahmadi Mosque at Tanta, and later the University of al-Azhar in Cairo. However, ‘Abduh’s experience with the traditional education system was disappointing. The outdated practice of having students memorize centuries-old commentaries on the Qur’an and Hadith frustrated him to the point that he ran away from school multiple times, returning only when his father forced him back.

In addition to his formal education, ‘Abduh received an informal education with his uncle Shaykh Darwish, whom he visited when he was not in school. Darwish had a profound influence on ‘Abduh. He was a Sufi mystic familiar with several North African Sufi Brotherhoods, such as the Sanusiyya and the Tajiniyya, which emphasized an important concept in Islamic discourse, ijtihad, or independent reasoning. Ijtihad allows scholars to rely upon their own reasoning to answer questions. It departs from the method employed at al-Azhar at the time, called taqlid, or reliance upon set precedence, which requires scholars to defer to previously established commentaries, most of which came from the medieval period. While not opposites, ijtihad and taqlid differ greatly from one another, but ‘Abduh learned both simultaneously.

‘Abduh’s two educations coincided. While he continued to tolerate the outdated methods at al-Azhar, he learned from his Sufi uncle who taught mysticism, asceticism, and individual reasoning. These two educations showed ‘Abduh two extremes, the dilapidated structure of Islamic learning in a weakened Egypt trying to imitate Europe, and the informal, thoughtful, and intimate education of Sufi Brotherhoods.

Suez Canal

Painting of the Suez Canal

Meanwhile, Egypt fell into an economic crisis. The Khedive, Isma’il Pasha, turned to European investors to help with the expensive construction of the Suez Canal. These investors, mostly British and French, took an increasingly demanding role in all of Egypt’s economic affairs after the Canal’s 1869 opening. The British exerted more and more control over the Egyptian state, at a time when European powers imposed colonial administration over much of the Islamic world. Many Muslim scholars turned their attention to the threat of Europeanization (taghrib). These scholars traveled, wrote, and publicly spoke about religious reform against colonial authority. One well-established scholar, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, met ‘Abduh while he was still a student at al-Azhar. In their meeting, they discussed Qur’anic exegesis and theology, and ‘Abduh became one of al-Afghani’s most devoted students.

As the political situation in Egypt worsened, ‘Abduh turned to the press and became politically active. Eventually becoming the chief editor of the Egyptian Official Gazette (Al-Waqai al-Misriya), ‘Abduh published numerous articles critical of what he saw as the most damaging facet of Egypt and the Islamic world: unchecked deference to authority. Taqlid and Europeanization were equally dangerous; ‘Abduh criticized the local ‘ulema for their “obsolete and rambling” denouncements of rubbing alcohol while the British exerted control over Egypt’s finances. Both parties, he argued, were responsible for Egypt’s problems.

Battle of Tel El Kebir 1882

The Battle of Tel-El-Kebir, 1882, leading to the British defeat of the Urabis

‘Abduh and al-Afghani were part of a nationalist movement in Egypt in the 1870s, which culminated in a militant revolt against the British authorities in 1879. Led by Ahmed Urabi, the revolt briefly established a new government in Egypt. ‘Abduh criticized the revolt but nevertheless offered his support through the press in the hopes that all Egyptians would unite under a movement to throw off British control. The Urabi Government, however, ended in 1882 when the British invaded, installed a colonial regime, and exiled of the revolt’s supporters, including ‘Abduh.


Jamal al-Din al-Afghani

While in exile, ‘Abduh and al-Afghani worked together, mostly in Paris, publishing articles on Islamic reform and European rhetoric that painted Islam as backwards by the standards of post-Enlightenment liberalism. Their writing emphasized criticism, but not blind dismissal, of European influence. He applied ijtihad to European as well as Islamic ideas. For example, a broad-based European education was useful, but the British authority on the grounds of racial and historical superiority was useless and inaccurate.

After his return to Egypt, ‘Abduh was named Grand Mufti of Egypt by the colonial administrators, and he used the opportunity to reform al-Azhar. He expanded the curriculum, adding western subjects such as political science, history, geography, and mathematics. At the same time, he overturned the outdated, taqlid-based system and instead required students to pass tests on their knowledge of both religious and secular subjects. Not only did ‘Abduh hope to produce morally upstanding students, but he also wanted intellectually sophisticated students with an understanding of economics, politics, military science, math, and natural sciences.

If previous generations would have had such education, Egypt might not have fallen into debt. A moral nation-state would not have felt the need to compete with Europe or would not have wanted such an expensive opening of the Suez Canal. An educated Egypt would have had a sufficient background to combat European rhetoric and influence.

‘Abduh once wrote that “life takes precedence over religion in Islam,” meaning that Islam is meant to improve the quality of life for all its subjects. An Islamic Egypt did not entail imitating the precedence of medieval societies, nor did it mean modernizing Islam to fit contemporary standards. Instead, it meant meeting contemporary challenges and constructing a modern nation-state as devoted, thoughtful, well-reasoned Muslims who continually developed along with the ebb and flow of a globalized world while retaining their identity, faith, and authenticity.

Cairo Book Fair

2015 Cairo International Book Fair

‘Abduh was named person of the year at the 2015 Cairo International Book Fair for his reformist discourse. His conceptualization of orthodoxy was a counterexample to numerous forces in his time, the outdated methods of his fellow ‘ulema, khedives trying to compete with the West, and European powers carving the Muslim world into colonies and protectorates. That the Cairo Book Fair would name ‘Abduh their person of the year shows a belief in the continued relevance of his theology. He defied the imperialist rhetoric imposed upon the Muslim world; he still defies the liberal-conservative dichotomy western forces use today to justify forced assimilation of Islamic societies with the West.  ‘Abduh was instead one voice in the diverse scholarly discourse of Islam, a diversity that western media ignore and powerful forces like the Saudi regime and terrorist organizations want to crush.

As such, allowing ‘Abduh to exist in his own context, a reformer trying to implement a more authentic Islam, is an exercise in understanding the intellectual diversity of the Muslim world as a whole, an understanding that over one billion people cannot be reduced to a largely fictional duality.

A Very Brief History of Pakistan

Official Flag of Pakistan

The Islamic Republic of Pakistan

Recently, the Taliban massacred 141 civilians, the majority of them children, in the Pakistani city of Peshawar. Amid the grief, shock, and moral outrage, it is necessary to fully understand how it is that a Pakistani branch of an Afghan organization came to commit atrocities in a very new state. Pakistan has a complex recent history, and many nations have played a part in shaping it. While it is important to remember that the attack was the direct result of men who decided to pick up guns and murder innocent children for seeking an education, I believe that historical context provides an even deeper understanding which is important in directing and expressing our collective outcry.

Jinnah and Gandhi

Pakistan was born from the Indian Independence Movement of the 1930s and 1940s, and became a state in 1947 when England implemented a Partition plan under the Viceroy of India, Lord Mountbatten. The central conflict for Indian Muslims at that time was the representation of the Muslim minority in what would be a newly independent state. Then, the Independence Movement was led by a diverse group of people representing a variety of ideas: Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, and Muhammad Ali Jinnah were among those. Jinnah was the leader of the Muslim League, and wanted Indian Muslims to have satisfactory representation or their own state. Because Hindu Nationalist organizations such as the RSS, which was responsible for Gandhi’s assassination, were often openly hostile to Indian Muslims, it is no surprise that Jinnah wanted a separate state to protect the Muslim minority.

East and West PakistanIn 1947, Pakistan and India became two states; Pakistan, however, had two separate territories. It was divided into two sections, East and West, with India between them. The Partition of India was abrupt and dissatisfied both new governments. On August 15, 1947, millions of people woke up in a new country; many people found themselves in what they feared was the wrong country. This caused a massive migration and territorial dispute, resulting in the the relocation of 15 million people and the death of over one million.

After Independence, Nehru and Jinnah led their new countries as Prime Minister and Governor-General respectively. Whereas Nehru was elected and reelected numerous times and led his country through political and economic turmoil, Jinnah died one year after the founding of Pakistan. He was unable to lead the country he helped create as Nehru was. Pakistan remained in the Commonwealth until 1956 when it became a Republic. Unfortunately, a coup put into place a military dictatorship; Ayub Khan ruled from 1958 to 1969, when he handed power to another general, Yahya Khan, who ruled until 1971.

Before 1970, Pakistan and India had engaged in two wars, first in 1947 and then in 1965. Both involved the disputed territory of Kashmir, a princely state with a Muslim majority that nevertheless became part of India. The third Indo-Pakistani war involved East Pakistan’s independence and Pakistan’s first election. Yahya Khan allowed for an election in 1970, the first in Pakistan’s history, but when the East Pakistani Awami League won a majority, Khan sent West Pakistani military forces to quell the nationalist, pro-independence movements in East Pakistan. Civil War broke out, India entered the conflict, and the Pakistani military engaged in large-scale atrocities against Bangladeshi communities. During this Bangladesh Liberation War, approximately ten million refugees fled to India, and the Pakistani military massacred about three million civilians in what is now recognized as an act of genocide. East Pakistan became Bangladesh, an independent state. In addition, over 90,000 Pakistani soldiers became prisoners of war, and Khan ceded power to Zulfikar Bhutto in late 1971.

New Pakistan

Pakistan witnessed rapid-fire succession of Presidents and Prime Minsters as well as a series of military coups. For the most part, Pakistani leaders have had little time to make significant accomplishments; leaders have ranged from socialists to dictators who oversaw wars, land disputes, and a genocide.

Jinnah’s plan for Pakistan was to create a Muslim State, but not an Islamic State in the traditional sense. Jinnah himself was a secular leader, and wanted a secular state which would nevertheless offer security for the interests of Muslims in the wake of Hindu Nationalists threatening to undermine their rights in India. For the most part, Pakistan has suffered conflicts between military rule and democratic representation: its first constitution was replaced by martial law under a military dictatorship in 1958; its second constitution was replaced by martial law under a military dictatorship in 1977. There have been three periods of military rule, four wars with India, and various domestic and foreign conflicts largely stemming from the botched 1947 Partition. It has nevertheless witnessed largely secular leadership.

Benazir Bhutto

Benazir Bhutto

While the Taliban seized control of Afghanistan and instituted strict religious and political rule that oppressed women, Pakistan saw the election of its first woman prime minister, Benazir Bhutto, in 1993. She had two nonconsecutive terms during the 1990s while the Taliban ruled in Afghanistan.

The arrival of violent Islamist militants largely followed the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. The mountainous, tenuous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan is often difficult to navigate, and provided a convenient hideout for Taliban militants fleeing Afghan, U.S., and NATO forces between 2001 and 2003. When President Bush decided to shift U.S. military attention to Iraq, Taliban militants had a moment to regroup, and have retained a solid foothold in Northeastern Afghanistan and Western Pakistan. Despite Pakistan’s support for the U.S. in its military endeavors, relations have been strenuous as drone strikes and military operations have caused damage to Pakistani civilians, infrastructure, and security. Islamist insurgents remain strong in Pakistan despite the country’s intellectual diversity, place in world politics, and relatively secular leadership.

Mountains separating Pakistan and Afghanistan

Mountains separating Pakistan and Afghanistan

The Pakistani Taliban, then, is a very new organization in a very new country whose history is categorized by episodic military interruptions of political, economic, and cultural development. The problem is not that Pakistan is struggling to define itself as an Islamic Republic or a developing nation; the problem is international. India on one side, Afghanistan on the other, and the U.S. above, Pakistan is locked amid the puzzle pieces of international diplomacy, colonially defined nation-states, and disputed borders and territories.

It is difficult to argue that Pakistan is at a crossroads because every moment in its history can be described as such. Instead, we should not let the Taliban’s violation of human rights define Pakistan; we should let the children attending school to learn math and language and geography and science and art and politics define Pakistan.


A Changing Interest in the Islamic World

Middle Eastern StudiesToday, i consider myself a student of world history, and I know that an interest in the Islamic world drew me into history. I have not always been fascinated with this region, but I can trace a my interest as far back as my childhood, growing up in a household that read news, politics, and political satire.

If I remember correctly, my family began watching The Daily Show right after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. That was my first introduction into world politics, but I was too young to understand any of it. Years later, in my sophomore year of high school, I developed a greater awareness of the world. It started when I read Persepolis by Marjane Satrapi for a creative writing class. Then, in a world history class, we discussed the spread of Islam. I watched Jon Stewart, Gary Trudeau, and other political humorists dissect the war on terror. Lastly, at the end of the year, my friends and I saw a woman in a niqab pass us in the street. One of my friends turned and asked me if Flagstaff had any mosques. I shrugged. Another friend said that there were none, and then both expressed their thankfulness for the lack of mosques in our town.

That moment left a strange impression on me. It was not my first encounter with bigotry. After all, I grew up in Arizona. But it left a sour taste in my mouth being so close to friends as they said something that to me was unfounded in sound logic. Why be happy that there are no mosques? I was baffled.

In college, I decided to educate myself about the Islamic world. I wanted to combat bigotry at first, but the more I learned about Edward Said and Orientalism, the more I learned about the Safavids and Ottomans and Mughals, the more interviews I saw of Afghan women who smile when they bring up the forty years of warfare they’ve seen, the more I realized that my true interest was not in combating bigotry, but in seeing a region of the world through the eyes of that region’s inhabitants. I don’t know exactly when I arrived at my next conclusion, but I am now fully aware that if I were to study only bigotry, hatred, and misrepresentation, I would still have a skewed view of the Islamic world. Opposing bigotry is necessary, but if it’s the main focus of study, one is left with a perception of Muslims as hapless victims whose lives began with the emergence of an oppressive Europe, and as nothing else. In truth, the history I learned about was full of great passions, eras of peace and poetry contrasted with periods of strife, poverty, combat, and reconstruction. The history of the Islamic world, as is the case with any other history, should be studied not from the perspective of lofty postcolonial analysts, but from the perspective of the history’s communities as they lived and thought.

My interest in world history began with a desire to oppose misrepresentation, and has become an interest in how people lived, ate, thought, worshiped, wrote, constructed buildings, saw the world, saw their neighbors, encountered one another, wrote music, traded goods, and understood their mortality. Postcolonial criticism, I think, should never serve to make scholars feel better about the academic ancestry’s role in justifying colonialism. A liberal European perspective of Europe is still a Eurocentric perspective. Instead, I want to study how Afghans constructed their own identities. I want to study court society in the Mughal Empire. I want to study Palestinian love poetry, the development of algebra and astronomy and science in the medieval era, and different Sufi brotherhoods in North Africa.

How else can we study history?